Endnote errors

The publisher has managed to mangle the endnotes for Chapters 1 to 9 and to introduce some other errors in chapters 13 and 14.

For Chapters 1 to 9 a large number of the endnote numbers have been deleted from the text and from the endnote section. However, the endnote reference/content has not been deleted, but there is no way for the reader to be sure where the reference/content applies to in the text.

In Chapter 13 one endnote number has been semi-deleted from the endnote section and from that point all the endnote numbers on the text pages and in the endnote section are one number out of order.

In Chapter 14 one endnote number has been deleted from the text and from the endnote section (ie like the problem in chapters 1 – 9). However, this has the effect of correcting the ‘one number out of order’ problem in Chapter 13.

I provide in this file a revised set of endnote references for Chapters 1 to 9 with the page number, a few words from the end of the text sentence to which the endnote applies and the reference/content. For Chapter 13 I provide a re-numbered set of endnotes. My renumbered endnotes point to the correct reference/content.

Where the endnotes are correct I have indicated this below. My sincere apologies to the reader for this messy solution. I did point out the problem to the publisher when I saw the page proofs and was assured that it would corrected.

Introduction

Endnotes correct (nos1 – 2)

Chapter 1 – Germany’s War Signals

P10 ‘…North of Ireland’ - Lloyd George, War Memoirs I, 32–33.
P10 ‘…amateur wireless sets’ - Baker, Marconi Company, 159.
P10 ‘…war was declared’ - Nickles, Under the Wire, 130–132.
P11 ‘…declared by telegram’ - Nickles, Under the Wire, 132.
P11 ‘… looking very grave’ - Lloyd George, War Memoirs I, 45–46.
P12 ‘… the outside world’ - Nickles, Under the Wire, 133, has a different account:
‘At 10.40pm (London time), as the British government, having heard nothing from Germany prepared to release a declaration of war, the Foreign Office rashly concluded that Germany had pre-emptively declared war on Britain: the Royal Navy had intercepted a wireless message from the German government warning German ships that hostilities with British were imminent; British officials incorrectly interpreted this information as meaning that Germany had declared war’. A British note of war was sent to the German ambassador citing the supposed German declaration of war, but had to be withdrawn before it reached him once it was realised that the interpretation was incorrect. Nickles cites two secondary sources for the whole paragraph (Gregory, Edge of Diplomacy, 70, and Albertini, Origins of the War, 3, 500–502) and which may refer to this message but no indication of which and with no further details of the message. ADM137/4065 records intercepted message sent out
several times on the 4th August, translated by British codebreakers as ‘Declaration of war between Germany and Great Britain is to expected hourly’. The German original has not been preserved. However, this message was sent in the ‘VB’ code and was also ciphered. The general weight of evidence suggests that this telegram could not have been decoded and deciphered before November 1914. All the messages recorded as having been intercepted on 4 August in ADM137/4065 are cited as having been coded with the VB or HVB code and then enciphered.

P12 ‘...on to London’ - John Ferris, Before Room 40: The British Empire and Signals Intelligence 1898–1914, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol 12, no 4, 450, citing ADM144/27, but no indication is given of any record of these interceptions; the earliest recorded interceptions I have seen are in ADM137/4065.

P12 ‘...the event of war’ – all intercepts quoted in this chapter are from ADM137/4065. Translations, plus information about date and place of origin and about the cipher used, are recorded in handwriting in a bound naval log book under this National Archives file reference. A note at the start of the log book states: ‘Early telegrams, chiefly relating to the beginning of the war - Partly Admiralty Staff and partly Colonial - Began to be read in November 1914.’

P15 ‘...incorporate the German wireless stations’ - CAB16/14; CAB16/189; CAB8/1; CAB16/32; Headrick, Invisible Weapon, 116–142.

P15 ‘...action on 9 August’ - Paice, Tip and Run, 16.

P15 ‘...were not intercepted)’ - Yates, Graf Spee’s Raiders, 80.


P15 ‘...the imperial idea’ - ADM137/4.

P16 ‘...employed on this message - Hezlet, Electron, 297; Keegan, Intelligence in War, 138, says that the wireless message was intercepted at the British wireless station at Suva, Fiji.

P16 ‘...token British military existence’ - Dixon, Clash of Empires.

P16 ‘...cutting German submarine cables’ - CAB16/14; CAB8/1; Headrick, Invisible Weapon, 85–111.

P17 ‘...cast back into the sea’ - Barbara Tuchman, Zimmermann Telegram, 10–11.

P17 ‘...the Allied cable network’ - Hezlet, Electron, 297, 83.

P17 ‘...reach of the British’ - German communications to the east via Austria and Turkey and the Middle East were not interrupted, but this did not provide any routes to the wider world because of British control of the submarine telegraph cables (and Russia of telegraph landlines) needed to forward any messages from the Middle East.

P19 ‘...worldwide wireless and cable network’ - Keegan, Intelligence in War, 161.

Chapter 2 – Room 40: Birth of a Legend

P21 ‘...amateur sleuths’ - HW3/7.

P21 ‘...Ewing promptly accepted’ - Beesly, Room 40, 9.

P21 ‘...study the messages’ - Hezlet, Electron, 89.

is weakened significantly by a handwritten entry in the first double pages of the document stating that the messages were only deciphered in November 1914; this fits with the official Room 40 story as the main German codebooks were not obtained by the Admiralty until about mid October and then the keys used for the cipher system on top of the coded messages had to be worked out and this took a couple of weeks (details of these codebooks are dealt with later in this Chapters 3 and 4). Headrick cites Santoni as claiming that messages, sent in enciphered VB code, between German ships in the Mediterranean the Goeben and the Breslau were deciphered and decoded by the British in August before the supposed date of the capture of the VB codebook. But the note mentioned above about the date from when these messages were decoded undermines this claim (also as Headrick demonstrates, having misinterpreted the date of the decoding of the Goeben/Breslau messages (see Chapter 1 of this book), it becomes necessary to invent reasons why the Royal Navy ‘despite its overwhelming superiority in the Mediterranean and its knowledge of [the German ships’] intentions, was not able to stop’ them, p. 160). As noted in Chapter 1, the bulk of the early intercepts were sourced from the Eastern Telegraph Co. and it is almost certain that the ETC would have kept copies of transmitted messages and that these could have been asked for by British codebreakers in the run up to the war or even after it started (when censorship was introduced by law and the government censors had access to all cable telegrams). However, it is also clear that German wireless messages were intercepted in increasing numbers in the month before the war started. Headrick records that Santoni gives a title for this document, ‘Log of intercepted German signals in Verkehrsbuch (VB) code from various sources. March 1914–January 1915.’ This is misleading, for though the bulk of messages in the document are in VB, there also messages in other codes: HVB, SKM (‘marine signal code’) and ABC (a widely used public code book); also some at least of these messages, in whatever code, were enciphered. Santoni is thus suggesting that the British must have acquired (or worked out) at least the German VB code book and how to break the various cipher keys used for this this theory to stand up.

P23 ‘…(to Britain’s advantage)’ - Peter Freeman, MI1(b) and the Origins of British Diplomatic Cryptanalysis in Intelligence and National Security vol 22, no 2, 206.

Freeman, who styled himself as a ‘retired civil servant’ in this and other papers (on the 'Zimmerman telegram’), was in fact the official historian at GCHQ for several years. Documents on MI1(b) are now available at the National Archives at Kew. HW3/184, HW3/185 and HW3/186 provide some details of the organisation; HW3/179, HW7/20, HW7/2,1 HW7/22, HW7/5 and HW7/6 contain intercepts. See also HW3/35 and ADM223/767. See also Andrew, Secret Service; Gudgin, Military Intelligence; Wade, Spies in the Empire, Seligmann, Naval Intelligence; Seligmann, Spies in Uniform.

P23 ‘…India and Persia’ - Freeman, Origins, 224.

P23 ‘…looking for the key’ - Freeman, Origins, 224.

P24 ‘…annoyed if they did’ - John Ferris, Before ‘Room 40’: The British Empire and Signals Intelligence 1890–1914 in Journal of Strategic Studies vol 12, no 4, 435–42 is the source for the details of the India Office cryptanalytic operations.

P24 ‘…are quite interesting’ - Ferris, Before ‘Room 40’, 441.

P25 ‘…the late 1880s’ - Andrew, Secret Service, 10/11.


P25 ‘…run up to the war’ - Matthew Seligmann, Naval Intelligence; Seligmann, Spies in Uniform.

P25 ‘… finish off the job’ - Andrew, Secret Service, 15.
P26 ‘…this would entail’ - Ferris, Before ‘Room 40’, 442–5.
P26 – ‘…a suitable time’ - Hall papers.
P26 ‘…as early as March 1914’ - ADM137/4065.
P27 ‘…from the end of July’ - Baker, Marconi Company, 159.
P27 ‘…Towyn, Stockton, etc.’ - ADM137/4065.
P27 ‘…(the accounts vary)’ - Ewing, Man of Room 40, 173 gives 4 August as the date Ewing and Oliver lunched together; Kahn, Codebreakers, 266, also has it that the lunch took place ‘on that first day of the war’; Beesly, Room 40, gives it as ‘one day in the first half of August’ (which of course includes a few days in the period before the outbreak of war as well as several more after the outbreak).
P27 ‘…proper record of them’ - Strachan, To Arms, 381.
P28 ‘…big man on it’ - Ramsay, 'Blinker' Hall, 29, citing ‘Recollections’ of Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Henry Oliver.
P28 ‘…shout solid sense’ - Ewing, Man of Room 40, 198.
P29 – ‘…reward of that work’ - Ewing, Man of Room 40, 144.
P29 ‘…mould an naval officer’ - Ewing, Man of Room 40, 167–168.
P30 ‘…little or nothing’ - HW3/3.
P30 ‘…Curtis and Parish’ - The spelling of surnames of Room 40 staff is inconsistent. I have stuck as closely as makes sense to spellings used in archive documents rather than those used by more recent authors.
P30 ‘…Little Man’ - Batey, Dilly, 33.
P30 ‘…a copy of the German codebook’ - HW3/3; Hall papers; Denniston papers.
P30 ‘basics of codes and ciphers’ - HW3/3; HW3/35.
P30 ‘…deciphering in the Boer War’ - Denniston papers.
P31 ‘…and 14 November 1913’ - ADM223/767 This file is an important source of information about MI5(b) between July 1914 and March 1915. It is a handwritten copy of various documents (including captured German military cipher instructions) and a log of important events. It appears to have reached the National Archives quite recently (but I have so far been unable to confirm the actual date it was opened to view) as it is not mentioned by ex-GCHQ historian Peter Freeman in his paper on the origins of MI1(b). Unlike the other recent releases on MI1(b) cited by Freeman and which are catalogued in the (HW) GCHQ series, this document is in the ADM (Admiralty) series of files. The National Archives catalogue has a misleading name: 'Room 40 OB Intelligence Division: Wireless Intercepts/Decrypts'. It is in fact about MI1(b) and it does not contain intercepts or decrypts.
P31 ‘…before the war’ - WO32/10776, cited in Freeman, Origins, 208.
P31 ‘…to field units’ - Freeman, Origins, 206–7. August 1914 to April 1915, under Director of Military Operations, as MO5(d); April 1915 to January 1916, under sub-directorate Directorate of Special Intelligence, as MO5; from January 1916, under Directorate of Military Intelligence, as MI5(b).
P31 ‘…about why they left’ - ADM223/767.
P32 ‘…picked up from the enemy’ - Freeman, Origins, 210.
P32 ‘…cryptographic section began’ - Denniston papers.
P32 ‘…sort of honorary member’ - HW3/6.
P32 ‘…last week of August’ - HW3/183.
P33 ‘…station was set up’ - ADM223/767.
P33 ‘…study of the en clair’ - Denniston papers.
Chapter 3 – Code Capture

P37 ‘…sparkling turquoise’ - Taylor, Storm and Conquest, 284–291.
P38 ‘…in the entrance’ - HW7/1.
P38 ‘…have any success’ - HW7/1.
P39 ‘…had been given up’ - HW7/1.
P39 ‘…north of Scotland’ – the copy handed over to the British was numbered 151; the other two copies were numbered 145 and 974.
P40 ‘…Miraculous Draft of the Fishes’ - HW7/1 In a draft chapter on codebreaking in a secret internal history of the naval war, written by Room 40 staff at the end of the war, this event is not described; however, there is a reference to the recovery of important documents with far-reaching consequences in Persia during the autumn of 1914. The author of that document wrote: ‘the [VB code]book was actually taken from a consulate in Persia at an early period in the war’. However, this story does not seem to appear elsewhere, whereas the miraculous draft of the fishes does find its way in. It is worth pointing out that the SKM, HVB and VB were not the only codebooks in use by the German navy, military and government at the time. There were several diplomatic codes and ciphers as well as army and naval ones. Several such diplomatic codes and ciphers will figure later in our story. It is possible that the author of this post-war document has confused the acquisition of the VB with some other codebook(s). Certainly some important secret documents including two diplomatic codebooks were captured in Persia in early 1915 (see Chapter 10), so possibly he has confused the two events. Or it may be that he has revealed the truth about how the VB was acquired.
P40 ‘…treated with caution’ - Hall papers.
P40 ‘…of critical importance’ - ADM137/4357.
P41 ‘…what was afoot’ - Denniston papers.
P41 ‘…early captured documents’ - Clarke papers.
P41 ‘died in 1948’ - Clarke papers.
P42 ‘…branches of civil life’ - Denniston papers.
P42 ‘…in supreme control’ - Denniston papers.
P42 ‘…forwarded to MI1(b)’ - ADM137/4065; ADM223/767.
P42 ‘got no response’ - ADM223/767.
P43 ‘…definite breach occurred’ - Denniston papers.
P43 ‘…based on cryptography’ - Denniston papers.
Chapter 4 Codes and Ciphers

P44 ‘…pacific effect of telegraphy’ - Standage, *Victorian Internet*, 151. 93
P44 ‘…to military ends’ - The optical or semaphore telegraph, on the other hand, was invented for military purposes and, by and large, used for military/diplomatic/administrative applications in many European countries, and with only limited commercial uses in Britain and Sweden.

P45 ‘…industry and commerce’ - A few codebooks had as many as 200,000 entries.


P46 ‘…become obsolescent’ - Kahn, *Codebreakers*, 850.

P47 ‘…according to one writer’ - Fitzgerald, *Knox Brothers*, 82.

P48 ‘…skilful cryptography (see chapter 12)’ - HW3/1; HW7/3; ADM137/4156; ADM137/4331.

P52 ‘…the English decipherer’ - HW3/1; HW7/3.

P52 ‘…malevolent hands’ - HW3/1; HW7/3.

P55 ‘…other list of plain entrance’ - HW3/1; HW7/3; ADM137/4374; ADM137/4671.

P57 ‘…end of the war’ - HW3/1; HW7/3.

P58 ‘…at the same time’ - HW7/1.

P61 ‘…listed first, then the eindezahl’ - HW137/4320.

P61 ‘…giving away details of the key’ - Examples of cipher intelligence gathered from intercepts: 15/5/1916, note by British intelligence from the Berlin/Madrid wireless link: ‘The message begins with the Schieber set at 111, and in accordance with instructions for that case the 3rd digit is transposed on the last slider while the last digit is transposed on the middle slider. The message then switches on to the number what was communicated in April of last year which is 763, the process of schiebering the 3rd digit by means of the last ‘slider and the 5th digit by means of middle slider continues’ (ADM223/740); 24/6/1916 intercept, Madrid to Berlin: ‘As much of the matter in telegrams 517 and 518, coded with the compromised cipher, has reference to the contents of secret telegrams – which can result in the compromising of the secret key also – I once more urgently request that such a procedure should be counter-ordered through the Cipher Office’ (ADM223/738); 22/7/1916, intercept Madrid to Berlin: ‘As cipher correspondence with “Satzbuch” is at once recognised by the five-figure [code]groups, all of which begin with 9, I propose permanently to replace this initial figure 9 by figures 2 to 8 at discretion’ (ADM223/738); 24/9/1916, intercept Madrid to Berlin, decipherment of a telegram was delayed because of a new cipher system. 10/10/16, intercept, Madrid to Berlin: ‘Envelope marked 2225 is on the way to you, containing two separate shifts of page numbers 10 to 309 of cipher 2310. I suggest using the first shift for secret matter up to 1/1/1917 and that you should give me a recognition signal for this; and from the 1 January the 2nd shift to come into force. In special circumstances the transposition in force up to the present could be used with this cipher. As there are two copies here of 2310, the old cipher could be simultaneously used for unimportant matter’ (ADM223/739); 12/10/1916 intercept Madrid to Berlin: ‘Please instruct the Cipher Bureau not to sent telegrams, contents of which are secret, with the most secret
method and especially when the same [information] is also communicated by the News Service, as in the case of Berlin telegram 979 of 9/10/16’ (ADM223/739); 19/10/1916 intercept Madrid to Berlin: Envelope 2225 received. ‘The new cipher method will be indicated in respect of the 1st shift by the numbers 27082, for the 2nd shift by the numbers 21894; in the case of the use of the latest cipher procedure, the signal 400 will be used for both shifts’ (ADM223/739).

P64 ‘...sent at the time’ - The example and explanation is based on ADM223/767.
P65 ‘...[and often less]’ - HW3/1; HW7/3.

Chapter 5 – Message Makers

P67 ‘...unknown peculiarities’ - HW7/1.
P67 ‘...if the need arose’ - Cited in Massie, *Castles of Steel*, 20.
P68 ‘...vertical sections meet’ - HW7/1.
P69 ‘...Dreadnoughts’HW7/1.
P70 ‘...much more remote’ - HW7/1.
P70 ‘...ensure compliance’ - ADM137/4228.
P71 ‘...command and staff work’ - Strachan, *To Arms*, 416.

Chapter 6 – Message Takers

P72 ‘...towards other subjects’ - Jolly, *Marconi*, 133.
P73 ‘...wireless sabotage’ - Weightman, *Marconi’s Magic Box*, 137.
P74 ‘...wireless was reinforced’ - Hezlet, *Electron and Sea Power*, 38.
P75 ‘...Chelmsford, Stockton, etc’ - ADM137/4065.
P76 ‘...worse for wear’ - Denniston papers.
P76 ‘...station in commission’ - HW3/5.
P76 ‘...any improvement’ - HW3/5.
P77 ‘...one in Malta’ - HW3/5.
P77 ‘...Sandringham staff’ - HW3/5.
P78 ‘…didn’t come down’ - A. J. Alan, My Adventure at Chiselhurst, in Foss, *Best of A. J. Alan*, 105–117; this and other A J Alan stories can be seen at [http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks06/0609241h.html](http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks06/0609241h.html)
P78 ‘…wireless telegraphy arrangements’ - HW3/35.
P78 ‘…wireless interception service’ - It is commonly suggested that Lambert, as a member of the staff of Room 40, was in some way involved in cryptography, but his contribution was to wireless interception procedures and techniques.
P79 ‘…doings of the German fleet’ - Denniston papers.
P79 ‘…front was developed’ - Baker, *Marconi*, 161–165.
P79 ‘…Westgate and Seaham’ - ADM223/768.
P80 ‘…on board naval ships’ - HW3/3.
P80 ‘…thus transmitted’ - HW7/1.
P80 ‘…by wireless telegraphy’ - HW7/1.

Chapter 7 – Message Breakers

P81 ‘…as they can go’ - Ewing, *Man of Room 40*, 160.
P82 ‘…with this work’ - The original is in the Clarke papers at Churchill Archives, Cambridge; a copy is in held in the National Archives in HW3/4.
P82 ‘…his long career’ - Stafford, *Churchill*.
P84 ‘…classical training’ - Denniston papers.
P85 ‘…feel quite frightened’ - Denniston papers.
P85 ‘…St. John’s College’ - HW3/3. The background information I have used comes from a CV compiled by Montgomery himself at the end of the war. Beesly, *Room 40*, 125, says that Montgomery came to Room 40 from the Censorship; also that he was from Westminster Presbyterian College, Cambridge, not part of the University.
P85 ‘…motor in 1926’ - HW3/3.
P85 ‘… Gentleman’s watch’ HW3/3; Denniston papers.
P87 ‘…for the purpose’ - HW3/3.
P88 ‘…possible to meet’ - HW3/3.
P89 ‘…emphasis in original’ - HW3/3; Denniston papers.
P90 ‘…was apparently happening’ - Cited in Massie, *Castles of Steel*, 312.
P90 ‘…control of the North Sea’ - Strachan, *To Arms*, 420–421.
P90 ‘…into our hands’ - ADM137/4065.p90 ‘…will be at sea’ - ADM137/4067.
P92 ‘…disappeared in another’ - Cited in Massie, *Castles of Steel*, 353.
P93 ‘…a next time’ - Cited in Massie, *Castles of Steel*, 358.
P93 ‘…darkness tomorrow’ - ADM137/4067.
P94 ‘…inner German Bight’ - ADM137/4067.
P94 ‘…three cheers’ - ADM137/4067.
P95 ‘…not further discussed’ - Young, *With the Battle Cruisers*, 41–42, 54–55.

Chapter 8 – Counter blockade

P96 ‘…whole harbour’ - HW7/1.
P96 ‘…surrendered to the Garry’ - HW7/1.
Chapter 9 – ‘For You the War is Over’

P100 ‘...to the Ems River’ - ADM223/740.
P103 ‘...return to port’ - ADM137/3959.
P103 ‘...British Isles’ - ADM137/4066.
P104 ‘...asked to investigate’ - ADM137/3960.
P104 ‘...Allied blockade’ - HW7/1.
P105 ‘...almost by accident’ - Halpern, Naval History, 314.
P105 ‘...operation by the German fleet’ - HW7/1.
P107 ‘...could be of use’ - HW7/1.
P108 ‘...emphasis in original’ - HW3/1; Clarke papers.
P109 ‘...world history’ - Massie, Castles of Steel, 639.
P109 ‘...entirely destroyed’ - ADM223/737.
P109 ‘...British trade’ - Massie, Castles of Steel, 659.

P110 ‘...Mr. H has got it’ - Exchange Officer (Malcolm Hay), Wounded and Taken Prisoner, 69–70.
P112 ‘...earliest opportunity’ - Harris, Haig, 91.
P112 ‘...Swiss border’ - Pearton, Knowledgeable State, 155.
P112 ‘...practically ceased’ - HW3/183.
P112 ‘...November 1914 onwards’ - HW3/183.
P113 ‘...indiscretions the better’ - ADM223/767.
P114 ‘...modern signals intelligence’ - Ferris, British Army, 4.
P114 ‘...observer/artillery communications’ - HW3/183; Hinrichs, Listening In, viii.
P114 ‘...to produce real problems’ - N. Barr, Command in the Transition from Mobile to Static Warfare, in Sheffield and Todman, Command and Control, 20–21.
P115 ‘...very weak signals’ - Peter Young, Power of Speech, 26.
P115 ‘...had little effect’ - HW3/183.
P115 ‘...carelessness on our part’ - HW3/183.
P116 ‘...user of wireless communication’ - HW3/183.
P116 ‘...Postal Censorship’ - ADM223/767.
Chapter 10 - ‘The Pillars of Hercules Have Fallen’

Endnotes correct (nos. 54 – 105)

Chapter 11 - Inside Room 40

Endnotes correct (nos. 106 – 122)

Chapter 12 - Codebreakers

Endnotes correct (nos. 123 – 153)

Chapter 13 - The Spanish Interception

Endnotes 154-158 correct, but after 158 the system has again awry. Endnote 159 on page does not refer to the endnote entry under that number (James, *Eyes of the Navy*, 110-115) but to the previous entry (Tucker, *European Powers*, 171) and from this point on all the endnote numbers on the page point to the wrong endnote entry by one place. So endnote number 160 on page 176 refers to the entry for 159! I have renumbered the endnotes correctly below:

159 Tucker, *European Powers*, 171. Tucker claims that the extracts from the diary were circulated during Casement’s trial, but this actually happened after trial and during the appeal process.


165 ADM223/736.

166 ADM223/737.

167 ADM223/737.

168 ADM223/739.

169 ADM223/737.

170 ADM223/738.

171 ADM223/738.

172 ADM223/738.

173 ADM223/739.

174 ADM223/739.

175 ADM223/739.

176 ADM223/739.

177 ADM223/739.

178 ADM223/737.

179 ADM223/739.
Chapter 14 – ‘Most Secret, Decipher Yourself’

There is a single occurrence of the problem affecting earlier chapters at the start of this chapter with first endnote number in the chapter missing from page 186. Also, the missing reference is not numbered in the endnote section so, to adopt the above solution for one entry: P186 ‘…among the belligerents?’ – HW7/1.
From this point on the endnotes are correct (nos. 196 – 218)

Chapter 15 – ‘97556 = Zimmermann’

   Endnotes correct (nos. 219 – 241)

Chapter 16 – On Timing and Treachery

   Endnotes correct (nos. 242 – 265)

Chapter 17 – Applied Intelligence

   Endnotes correct (nos. 266 – 317)

Chapter 18 – War, Revolution and Peace

   Endnotes correct (nos. 318 – 328)

Chapter 19 – After the War

   Endnote correct (nos. 329 – 351)

Epilogue

   Endnotes correct (nos. 352 – 365)
The reader may also note the publisher has got the wrong chapter headings on several pages, usually the early pages of the next chapter. Chapter 19 (After the War) has the wrong page heading (War, Revolution and Peace) throughout the chapter. Chapter 18 (War, Revolution and Peace) has a page heading (Blood of Kings) which is nothing to do with my book and is presumably a leftover from a previous book layout/edit by the publisher.

My apologies for the inconvenience caused by the state of the endnotes.